- Identity Thesis
- mental states are just physical states
- the identity thesis only gets meaning in contrast to dual behaviorism
- belief states are a kind of physical state
- Functionalism
- Dual Behaviorism
- menal state
- physical state
- mental states
- "mary belives the election is Tuesdays means something about belief behavior
- token types
- for ever mental type there is a physical type
- minimal identity thesis
- the richer thing comes in functionalism
- functionalism is to deal with the problems of behaviorism
- let's suppose you have a kind of machine
- your computers are functionally understood
- you treat your computer behavioristically
- there is a black box with outputs and inputs
- what we think is going on is that there is a database to see if the word is used in that way
- or uses a variation that could be that word using an algorithm
- what Aristotle says is that one of the marks of sensation are the sense that we are sensing or that we perceive that we are perceiving
- what armstrong does is he picks this up
- my driving is happening whether i am aware of it or not
- the driver in a state of automisim is aware of the road or he would be in a ditch
- i concieve of conciousnes as kant talks about an inner sense
- each of us has the power to percieve our own minds
- the conclusion is there are unner states in purly physical states
Monday, October 31, 2016
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